TUNISIA IS A BREEDING GROUND OF TERRORISM

Security is one of the key challenges for Tunisia’s democratic transition, since the 2011 revolution ousted the authoritarian regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. International actors (NATO, the European Union, key EU Member States and the United States) immediately provided assistance to facilitate the reform of Tunisia’s security sector and to bolster the capabilities and the effectiveness of its armed forces. However, a stark deterioration of the security situation within the country since 2015, as well as in neighbouring Libya, has shown the Tunisian security forces’ persisting difficulties in maintaining stability and protecting their citizens. In addition, the government’s failure to deliver economic reforms, combined with growing socioeconomic discontent, have significantly slowed down Tunisia’s progress towards democratic and economic development, which in turn has increased the country’s fragility and vulnerability to a variety of threats, for instance by making Tunisia a hot spot for ISIS recruitment.

Today’s Tunisia is less a potential model for democratic transition than a test case for the nexus between security-development and cooperation among international actors, given the need for democratic development to be supported by development actions, financial assistance, and adequate security support. Tunisia is also a test case for transatlantic cooperation, in light of rising competition among different actors and the uncertainty surrounding the approach of the Trump administration towards NATO and the Mediterranean, as well as volatile domestic politics in many EU countries as a result of the rise of populist movements.

This policy brief looks at the evolving security situation in Tunisia by appraising the relations with key providers of security support (NATO, the EU, individual EU Member States, and the United States). It is argued that, despite significant increase in support for Tunisian security since 2015, a lack of coordination and an integrated security-development strategy may erode part of the country’s progress towards stability. Looking to the future, enduring incoherent, uncoordinated assistance or even a reduced commitment from the international community are to be considered as indirect, yet key drivers of fragility and violence, as new “empty spaces” prone to radicalization may emerge.

Security Challenges and Trends
Since the 2011 Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia has undergone a fragile democratic transition. Unlike other Arab countries, the country has been seen by the international community as an example of peaceful transition and political compromise, thus far avoiding degeneration into civil war or military intervention to restore order. However, Tunisia’s progress towards building a stable democracy is increasingly in danger, the pace of reforms having slowed down greatly since the 2014 elections, the economy remaining weak and domestic discontent and social unrest on the rise. Naturally, security is also part of the picture. Challenges to Tunisian security include a difficult domestic security environment, an unstable region, insecure borders and ineffective security forces, which together constitute fertile ground for jihadi terrorism.

Domestically, the situation severely deteriorated in 2015, with the terrorist attacks at the Bardo museum (18 March), the mass shooting at a beach resort in Sousse (26 June) and the attack on a military bus in downtown Tunis (24 November), all claimed by the Islamic State and perpetrated by young Tunisian men. As a matter of fact, the Tunisian youth has become vulnerable to radical influence, generating around 3,000 foreign fighters, and a growing presence among the ranks of the Islamic State in Syria, Iraq and Libya. Root causes of the growth of radical jihadist elements and their success among young Tunisians are factors such as poverty, economic marginalization and a lack of opportunities, in combination with a sense of injustice and repression (Petré, 2015). In addition to that, outrage and fear sparked by a fragile security situation – due to kidnappings, beheadings and other incidents – have become the “new norm” in several Tunisian cities and remote areas.

Conflicts and turmoil in neighbouring countries obviously pose another major threat to Tunisian security. Porous borders allow Libya’s chaos to spill over into Tunisia, and back. Islamist militants, many of whom were freed from prison after the fall of Ben Ali, have fled to Libya to become key fighters for the Islamic State. Some militants have recently begun to return, smuggling in explosives and weapons for attacks on the capital. According to the Tunisian security forces, the gunmen that carried out the attacks at Bardo and Sousse were trained in Libya.

Against this backdrop, Tunisian security forces have been forced to quickly reform and cope with new threats, revising an ill-equipped and dysfunctional apparatus. Those efforts have partially succeeded, though significant challenges remain. A state of emergency was declared after the Sousse attack. Greater cooperation between the National Guard and the Tunisian armed forces proved successful in producing joint operations against Islamist groups. Efforts to counter terrorism have also progressed. Since 2011, the Defense Ministry’s budget has grown by an average of 21 percent each year (Grewal, 2016), with a steady stream of new weapons contracts and international partnerships – the United States, for instance, have tripled military aid to Tunisia in 2015. Post-revolution Tunisian armed forces have increased in strength. Yet, reforms are still needed to maximize efficacy, and tools such as a comprehensive defense strategy would enable a more forward-looking approach to security threats [1]. Furthermore, fully fledged reform of the security sector, generating effective police and security forces, has not occurred yet, mostly because of the absence of political leadership, sustained legislative initiatives and due to mutual distrust among political parties [2].

International Security Assistance
The international community, and in particular the United States, NATO, the European Union and key EU Member States, have taken bolder steps since the 2015 terrorist attacks to improve Tunisian security and prevent the country from becoming a hub for ISIS, which would thwart a peaceful and democratic transition to democracy. Initiatives are manifold, and range from technical assistance to bolster the capabilities and knowhow of Tunisian security forces, support for security sector reform, aid for the military (weapons, equipment, training), and enhanced counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. This section reviews the security links between Tunisia and key Western powers.

United States: Increased Military Aid
The United States has significantly increased its military and police aid, as well as arms deliveries to the Middle East and North Africa region since 2009. Tunisia is no exception. Three weeks after the Bardo attack, the US administration announced that it would triple military spending for Tunisia and training for its armed forces. In 2016, the White House requested a sharp increase in military aid to Tunisia, up to $99 million, compared to a budget of $32.9 million in 2014 (Goodman, 2015). The 2017 budget is being considered by the US Congress as part of the “Combating Terrorism in Tunisia Emergency Support Act of 2017” – the bill is scheduled to be approved by April 2017 (“All Bill Information (Except Text) for H.R.157”, 2017).

The Obama administration also granted Tunisia the status of “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA) on 10 July 2015 [3], a distinction that carries a higher level of strategic military cooperation with the United States. For instance, it allows the US government to devote additional funding to joint counterterrorism research and development projects for Tunisia, or promote increased US-Tunisia military cooperation in combat operations [4]. In practical terms, US support to Tunisia covers training of special forces and military equipment, such as bulletproof vests, helmets, shields and personnel gear, night-vision goggles for the National Police and the National Guard, 12 Black Hawk helicopters, missiles and machine guns, supplied through the US government’s Foreign Military Sales Program. Additional support to Tunisian counterterrorism efforts comes through the Defense Department’s Counterterrorism Partnership Fund.

NATO’s Role after the Warsaw Summit
The 2016 Warsaw Summit prioritized security challenges coming from the Southern flank in NATO’s agenda, requesting allies to enhance initiatives and strengthen cooperation with partners in the fields of counter-terrorism, stabilization, defence capacity-building, maritime security and border control. Allies agreed to provide increased military support to countries in the Middle East and North Africa that are targets of Islamic extremism, including Tunisia.

As part of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, NATO’s contribution to maritime security in the Mediterranean amounts to one operation (Sea Guardian) and Standing Naval Forces integrated into the NATO Response Force (NRF) [5]. Operation Sea Guardian was launched in October 2016, to support maritime situational awareness, counter-terrorism at sea and capacity building in the Mediterranean. NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 2 was deployed in the Aegean Sea in February 2016 to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance in the territorial waters of Greece and Turkey, as well as in international waters, in an effort to cut the lines of human trafficking and illegal migration.

Besides the provision of security at sea, NATO has also boosted support to strengthen Tunisian capacities to counter terrorism. Since July 2016, NATO has been advising the Tunisian authorities on the development of a Tunisian Intelligence Fusion Centre and giving training to the Tunisian Special Operations Forces, namely on intelligence procedures in support of counterterrorism activities. NATO’s support to Tunisia constitutes a change in NATO’s strategic posture in the fight against terrorism, insofar as defence capacity building tools are understood not as purely reactive or in response to ongoing conflicts, such as in Iraq and Libya, but also in a preventive manner, as in Tunisia, or Jordan: stable and functioning states, with effective armed forces, are not only more likely to prevent terrorist attacks, but also reduce and manage the migration flows and illicit trafficking across land and sea borders, which, in turn, has a stabilizing effect at the regional level [6].

The EU and Key Member States
The battle against militants and terror groups has been cause for growing concern for the EU. For this reason, security cooperation has been deepened in the area of counterterrorism and prevention of violent extremism and radicalization, although this has so far happened outside the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework. The 2016 Joint Communication Strengthening EU support for Tunisia states that the EU should help Tunisia in “building national capacities and provide expertise on issues such as preventing radicalization, border management; encouraging rule-of-law and prosecution; strategic communications; addressing foreign terrorist fighters and organized crime” (European Commission & HR/VP, 2016). The EU-Tunisia Action Plan 2013-2017 lists among the priority actions “enhancing cooperation in areas such as democracy and human rights, foreign and security policy, cooperation in the fight against terrorism” (European External Action Service [EEAS], n.d). The EU has allocated 23 million euros to support a programme for the reform of the security sector in Tunisia as part of the Action Plan, focusing on the modernization of the internal security forces in line with human rights standards, including the reform of evaluation, recruitment and training systems. The programme also advises the Tunisian State on the establishment of an interministerial crisis cell, and strengthens technical and operational capacities of land border security services to support the fight against cross-border crime, with new rapid operational centres created in Medenine, Tataouine, and Kasserine. This support is complemented by the justice reforms, supported by the EU with a budget of 40 million euros. Other security-related budget lines have included the Instruments contributing to Stability and Peace, with a contribution of 4 million euros in 2015.

That said, military support and security cooperation with Tunisia remain firmly in the hands of key Member States. After 2015, France stepped up cooperation, and has trained police and assault teams, supplied analysts and border security personnel, coordinated intelligence operations, and helped open a military training centre in Gafsa. In late 2015, Paris approved a 20-million-euro package to equip Tunisian special forces and intelligence operations.